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I. INTRODUCTION 
Glory days well they’ll pass you by 
Glory days in the wink of a young girl’s eye 
Glory days, glory days 
Bruce Springsteen, Glory Days (1984) 
Patent pools—licensing arrangements in which multiple patent owners 
agree to license their intellectual property to each other, third parties, or 
both2—have existed in some form for nearly two centuries.3  During that
time, courts and competition agencies have noted both the benefits and
risks associated with pools.  On the one hand, patent pools can reduce 
transaction costs, clear blocking positions, and enable parties to avoid 
costly infringement litigation.4  On the other hand, patent pools can serve 
as a vehicle for collusion, charge for unnecessary patents, and include 
exclusionary licensing terms.5  Nonetheless, the consensus for more than 
twenty years has been that the procompetitive benefits of patent pools 
outweigh their anticompetitive effects.6 
But the current assessment of patent pools may be influenced by the 
nostalgia of events long past.  Developments over the past two decades 
warrant revisiting some of the assumptions regarding the procompetitive 
2. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENT POOLS AND ANTITRUST – A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 3 (2014) [hereinafter WIPO, PATENT POOLS], https://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/35DU-6YGB]. 
3. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent 
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011). 
4. See WIPO, PATENT POOLS, supra note 2, at 3.
 5. See id.
 6. Id. 
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nature of patent pools.  Creativity and increasingly aggressive licensing
behavior also are amplifying the anticompetitive effects of certain pools. 
As a result, the promise of using certain types of patent pools to resolve 
licensing issues for standards-essential patents (SEPs) may be as yet
another unrealized dream from glory days gone by.
This Article proceeds as follows.  First, it provides an overview of 
necessary background principles to understand the interaction between
patent pools, commitments to license SEPs on terms that are fair, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory (FRAND), and competition law.  Second, it explores
how competition law principles traditionally have been applied to SEP patent 
pools and explores business review letters issued by the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) addressing patent pools.  Third, it critically examines how 
some of the assumptions underlying the procompetitive nature of patent
pools no longer are true in today’s SEP assertion environment.  Fourth, it 
assesses how the anticompetitive risks of certain SEP pools likely eclipse 
their alleged procompetitive justifications.  Finally, this Article concludes 
by providing specific recommendations to restore SEP patent pools to a 
position where an appropriate balance is struck between competition risks 
and benefits. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Patent Pools & Similar Arrangements 
A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent holders to
license certain patents to each other, to third parties, or to both.7  The number 
of patents involved can range from quite small to as many as several thousand 
patents for some of the larger pools covering technology implicating large 
numbers of patents. The earliest patent pools date back to the mid nineteenth 
century when a group of sewing machine manufacturers decided to cross-
license their patents to each other after being embroiled in infringement 
litigation.8  Today, patent pools are big business; revenues derived from 
7.  WIPO, PATENT POOLS, supra note 2, at 3; see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
§ 5.5 (2017) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
publicstatements/1049793/ip_guidlines_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/482A-C6Y2]. 
8. See generally Mossoff, supra note 3 (chronicling the details of the so-called 
Sewing Machine War). 
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sales of devices based partially or wholly on technologies covered by
patent pools are at least $100 billion U.S. annually.9 
Patent pools exist in many forms. The most conventional type of patent 
pool is a licensing pool, also known as an “offensive” pool. These pools 
generally are characterized by two common features.  First, licensing 
pools create an entity separate from the pool members—the patent 
holders—that actively seeks to license members’ patents to third parties,
often on a single, portfolio basis.10  Second, the licensing pools establish 
a mechanism to allocate revenues generated through licensing activities 
amongst the members.11  The MPEG LA patent pool is an example of such 
a licensing pool.12  It offers several licenses on a portfolio basis for various
standards and other technology platforms.  The members, whose patents 
are licensed in the portfolio, vary depending on the specific technology, 
as do the royalty rates charged.13  The bulk of this Article will focus on 
these types of patent pools.
Distinguished from traditional patent licensing pools are defensive 
patent aggregators. Such entities purchase patents to keep them out of the 
hands of entities that would likely assert them—generally patent assertion 
entities (PAEs).14  Those purchases are financed through subscription fees 
from members who elect to join the defensive pool, which also are granted
licenses through the patent aggregator.15  As their name suggests, defensive
patent pools do not actively seek to license their portfolios or assert them 
in litigation, unless as a counterclaim.  RPX Corporation is an example.16 
Another form of a patent pooling arrangement is cross-licensing.  Here, 
there is no independent entity that licenses patents amongst members to
third parties; instead, at least two patent holders agree to cross-license their 
patents to each other.17 Some of the competition law concerns present with
offensive licensing pools arise with cross-licensing,18 but offensive licensing 
9. Gavin Clarkson & Joshua Newberg, Blunt Machetes in the Patent Thicket: 
Modern Lessons from the History of Patent Pool Litigation in the United States Between 
1900 and 1970, J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2018, at 1, 13. 
10. Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. 
ON REGUL. 359, 368 (1999). 
11. Id. 
12.  MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com [https://perma.cc/GN8E-WF8P]. 
13. See id.
 14. See, e.g., James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 725, 757 (2015). 
15. See, e.g., Cascades Comput. Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 12-cv-01143-YGR, 
2016 WL 705982, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016), aff’d, 719 F. App’x 553 (9th Cir. 2017). 
16. More information about RPX can be found at RPX RATIONAL PATENT, 
https://www.rpxcorp.com/ [https://perma.cc/D64D-8CDR].
17. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 10, at 369. 
18. See id.; see also DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 5.5. 
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pools warrant greater antitrust scrutiny because of the larger number of
players involved and increased possibility for collusion.19 
B. SEPs, FRAND, and Competition Law 
Formal industry standards are vital to the modern economy.  They enable 
seamless interoperability across multiple technological products, software, 
and services provided by different companies.  An example of formal
industry standards is wireless communications for cellular phones and
other connected devices. With the advent of 5G and attendant upsurge in
Internet of Things (IoT) devices, standardized technology will become an
even more common feature of everyday life. 
Despite the benefits of standardization, technical standards also pose 
certain risks.  One such risk is the inability to obtain access to proprietary
technology that is incorporated in the standard.20  A related risk is a patent
owner conditioning access to that technology on terms and conditions in
excess of the value of the underlying patent. 
To minimize those risks, the intellectual property rights policies of most 
standard-setting organizations (SSOs) require a patent holder to make a 
commitment that it will license any patents that turn out to be essential on 
FRAND terms.21  Such self-declared patents are referred to as SEPs.22 If 
the patent holder declines to make a FRAND commitment, the SSO generally 
will not include that patentee’s technology in the relevant standard.23  The 
FRAND commitment thus constitutes a voluntary agreement by the patent
holder to curtail the full scope of its statutory patent grant in exchange for 
19. THOMPSON REUTERS, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO LICENSING § 23:30 (2020). 
20. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current
Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 
39 (2015) (discussing the history of antitrust patenting orders and their relation to modern 
FRAND commitments and standard-setting). 
21. See, e.g., EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI DIRECTIVES 39–40 (2020),
https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/69SN-NHNL].  ETSI 
also requires patent holders to disclose patents or patent applications that are or may be 
essential. Id. at 39.  Other SSOs do not require such disclosure of individual patents but 
still require a FRAND assurance. 
22. As described infra Section V.C, SSOs rely on members to declare patents that
are or may be essential to the standard but otherwise do not independently verify essentiality. 
Whether a patent is truly essential to a standard can only be determined definitively by a 
court. 
23. See, e.g., Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, INT’L TELECOMM. 
UNION, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/VL9Z-QJ2B]. 
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the benefit of being included in the standard.  That commitment is irrevocable 
and enforceable by third parties, such as companies making devices that
practice the standard.24 
The FRAND commitment is necessary because inclusion of a technology 
in a standard confers significant “after the fact” bargaining power upon
the SEP-holder vis-à-vis potential licensees. Once a standard is adopted, 
companies wanting to make devices that practice the standard have no 
choice but to use the technology covered by those SEPs.  Standardization 
eliminates potential competitors for alternative technologies that are not 
selected for the standard.25 
The FRAND commitment is thus designed to cap the market power of 
SEP-holders after standardization, decreasing the risk of hold-up and 
unreasonable royalty stacking.  Hold-up occurs when SEP-holders attempt to
leverage their enhanced bargaining power over licensees to extract royalties
that exceed the incremental value of the technology.26  Royalty stacking
is when a standard or group of standards involves multiple patents; the
royalties that individual SEP owners seek do not account for the aggregate 
royalties created by those various licensing demands.27 
Of course, if a patent holder does not wish to be bound by the FRAND 
commitment, it may choose not to contribute its technology to the 
standardization process.  While that patent holder would be deprived of 
the benefit of more potential licensees due to widespread adoption of the
standard, the patent holder could pursue higher, non-FRAND rates, or decline
to license its patented technology altogether.28 
24. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). 
25. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2007). 
26. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
27. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 
2015); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2010–13 (2007). 
28. In some situations, the patented technology could be included in the standard
absent a FRAND commitment if, for example, the SSO and its members decide the 
technology is needed absent a FRAND commitment. See Broadcom Corp., 501 F.3d at 
315–16. This only is likely to be the case if the patent holder has market power before the 
standard is set, in which case the patent holder under those circumstances would not forgo 
the benefits of widespread adoption. See id. 
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III. PATENT POOLS AND COMPETITION LAW 
A. Overview 
Though the competition law treatment of patent pools has evolved 
substantially over time,29 the modern view generally is illustrated by the 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property jointly 
promulgated by the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission in 1995 and 
updated in 2017 (the Guidelines).30  The Guidelines recognize that patent
pools implicate both procompetitive justifications and anticompetitive 
risks.31 
Specifically, patent pools can result in efficiency gains by providing a
“one-stop shop” for licensing.32 By doing so, pools can reduce the transaction 
costs associated with bilateral negotiations amongst multiple patent holders 
and potential licensees.33  Additionally, patent pools can clear blocking 
positions.34  A blocking position arises when a patent owned by someone 
else “prevents a patentee from exploiting its own patent”; by including 
blocking patents in a pool, other patentees can gain the benefits of
commercialization of their technology that otherwise would have been
prohibited.35  Another procompetitive feature is that patent pools, like any
other patent license agreement, avoid infringement litigation.36  This frees 
up resources that otherwise would have been diverted to costly litigation 
to spend on productive activities such as research and development.  It 
also conserves judicial resources. Finally, though not mentioned in the
Guidelines, some have noted how patent pools can promote competition 
29. See generally Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of 
Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2004) (discussing the history of courts’ 
interpretations of patent pooling and cross-licensing as they relate to antitrust laws).
30. See id.; DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.0. 
31. See DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, §§ 2.0 & 2.1. 




33. DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 5.5. 
34. Id. 
35. Scott Sher, Jonathan Lutinski & Bradley Tennis, The Role of Antitrust in Evaluating 
the Competitive Impact of Patent Pooling Arrangements, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 111, 113 
(2012).
36. DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 5.5. 
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through the encouragement of network externalities, especially in 
communications-related technologies.37 
Pools also pose anticompetitive risks.  Like any cooperative agreement
amongst competitors, patent pools can provide a vehicle for collusion to
engage in naked price fixing or market allocation; the Guidelines make
clear that such behavior is subject to per se condemnation.38  Less egregious
behavior may also be challenged as anticompetitive where the pool does 
not “contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity 
among the participants.”39  To the extent a pool includes patents that are 
substitutes for each other—non-blocking patents that cover alternative 
technologies—as opposed to complementary patents—patents which must 
be used together40—the pool is more likely to harm competition.41  Patent 
pools additionally can subject licensees to exclusionary licensing terms
like excessive grantbacks, which can deter incentives for licensees to 
invest in research and development.42  Further, patent pools can shield 
weak, or even invalid, patents from litigation when those patents are
included in a portfolio alongside strong and valid patents.43 
Relatedly, patent pools can undermine competition by seeking portfolio- 
wide royalties on patents that are not necessary for a particular licensee. 
It is well recognized that a substantial number of patents alleged to be 
SEPs neither are valid nor essential, as further described in Section V.C 
below.44  Pools also may seek portfolio-wide licenses on patents that, while
truly SEPs, nonetheless are not necessary for a particular licensee whose 
products practice only a subset of what the standard specifies.  Stuffing
large numbers of unnecessary patents into SEP licensing pools enables the 
pool owners to argue that the underlying pool is far more valuable than it 
37. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 10, at 380. 
38. DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 5.5. 
39. Id. 
40. WIPO, PATENT POOLS, supra note 2, at 4. 
41.  Sher, Lutinski & Tennis, supra note 35, at 119. 
42. See DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 5.5. 
43. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent 
Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 14 (2010). 
44. See, e.g., Lorenz Brachtendorf, Fabian Gaessler & Dietmar Harhoff, Approximating 
the Standard Essentiality of Patents – A Semantics-Based Analysis (June 4, 2019) (unpublished
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is.45  When demand is elastic, which often is the case with consumer goods,46 
the increased royalties are passed through to consumers as an input cost 
for the finished end products and thus decrease overall output.47 
B. Historical DOJ Business Review Letters on Patent Pools 
With respect to patent pools of SEPs, the DOJ articulated antitrust guidance 
through a series of business review letters issued in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, as well as a very recent letter on the Avanci 5G pool, discussed 
in the next section.48  The business review process enables persons to
formally inquire about the DOJ’s enforcement intentions concerning specific
proposed conduct.49  These letters are noteworthy because, although
traditional patent law principles obviously apply to SEPs, application of 
those principles also considers the consequences of standardization and the 
significance of the FRAND commitment.  The DOJ analyzed the following 
SEP patent pool proposals through business review letters: (1) the MPEG 
45. This risk is highest when pools do not adequately utilize an independent technical
expert, along with competent and independent legal consultants, to screen for the validity,
essentiality, and enforceability of the underlying patents. 
46. See, e.g., DON HOFSTRAND, IOWA ST. UNIV., FILE NO. C5-207, ELASTICITY OF 
DEMAND 1 (2007), https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/pdf/c5-207.pdf
[https://perma.cc/57LK-SS7A].
47. As discussed in Section V.C, infra, the One-Monopoly-Rent-Theorem does not 
affect this reality.
48. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to 
Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell 1 (June 26, 1997) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of 
Just.) [hereinafter MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter], http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/busreview/215742.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPV6-H53Q]; Letter from Joel I. Klein, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell 1 
(Dec. 16, 1998) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter 1998 DVD DOJ Business 
Review Letter], https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/96JH-59DH]; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., to Carey R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 1 (June 10, 1999) 
(on file with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter 1999 DVD DOJ Business Review Letter],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/08/01/2485.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7Y96-EFM8]; Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
to Ky P. Ewing, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. 1 (Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of 
Just.) [hereinafter 3G DOJ Business Review Letter], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/200455.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AR2-TLZ7]; Letter from Makan 
Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen/, U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Mark H. Hamer, Baker & McKenzie 1 
(July 28, 2020) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter Avanci 5G DOJ Business 
Review Letter], https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1298626/download [https://perma.cc/ 
6FGS-W6A4].








LA group patents necessary to comply with the MPEG-2 video compression 
standard,50 (2) two pools related to standardized technology for DVD-
ROM and DVD-video formats,51 and (3) a partnership amongst several 
companies to create licensing “platforms” for each of the five 3G radio 
interface technologies,52 (collectively, the DOJ Business Review Letters). 
In each of the DOJ Business Review Letters, the DOJ noted that the 
SEP pools involved had both anticompetitive risks and procompetitive 
benefits.53  That is not surprising given the history of enforcement actions 
against certain offensive pools.54  Nonetheless, the DOJ ultimately concluded
that, on balance, the justifications of the proposed pools outweighed their 
risks. Those conclusions were based, in part, on the fact that the pools at 
issue were structured as follows: 
 the portfolio was limited to technically essential patents,
which, by definition, are not in competition with each other; 
 an independent expert assessed whether the patents were 
technically essential; 
 the patents included in the pooled portfolio licenses also
remained available for licensing outside of the pool;55 
 the patents included in the pool were not expired; 
 licensing was available on a nonexclusive, worldwide basis; 
and 
 grantbacks were limited to essential patents for the same 
standard.56 
The consensus flowing from both the DOJ Business Review Letters and
the Guidelines57 is that patent pools—absent cartel-like collusive behavior—
are neither per se legal nor illegal under U.S. antitrust law.  Instead, they 
50. See MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 1.
 51. See 1998 DVD DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48; 1999 DVD DOJ 
Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 1. 
52. See 3G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 1.
 53. See MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter supra note 48, at 15; 1998 DVD 
DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 9–14; 1999 DVD DOJ Business Review 
Letter, supra note 48, at 14–16. 
54. See, e.g., Summit Tech., Inc., 127 F.T.C. 208, 240 (1999) (settlement in which 
two companies that were alleged to have formed a patent pool to fix prices agreed to
abandon the pool). 
55. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691, 
698 (2004).
56. See generally Gilbert, supra note 43 (discussing grantbacks and non-exclusive 
licenses); see also WIPO, PATENT POOLS, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
57. When the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission updated the Guidelines in 2017, the 
agencies did not include any new guidance specifically addressing FRAND-encumbered SEPs.
See generally DOJ/FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 7 (providing updated guidance on cross-
licensing and pooling arrangements and their potential anticompetitive effects). 
426 
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are analyzed under the rule of reason where the procompetitive justifications
and anticompetitive risks are both carefully examined to determine
whether one outweighs the other.
It also is worth noting that the patent pools at issue in the DOJ Business
Review Letters were relatively simple in terms of the number of patents 
that were to be licensed, which itself demonstrates transparency. The MPEG 
LA pool held twenty-seven patents among nine companies.58  Of the two 
DVD pools, one held 210 patents among three companies, and the other held
fifty-one patents among six companies.59 The 3G pool was a partnership 
among nineteen companies to divide licensing functions amongst five 
platforms.60 
C. DOJ Avanci 5G Business Review Letter 
In addition to the historical letters discussed above, the DOJ recently
issued a business review letter addressing the Avanci pool’s licensing 
program for 5G technologies in the automotive industry.61  The Avanci 
pool was formed in 2016 by several prominent cellular SEP-holders—
including Nokia, Ericsson, and Qualcomm—to license wireless communications
SEPs specifically for use in connected vehicles.62 
The Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter did not address whether 
Avanci’s licensing terms complied with its members contractual FRAND
obligations. Nonetheless, as with the prior DOJ Business Review Letters,
the DOJ concluded in its July 28, 2020 letter that the Avanci 5G licensing 
program was unlikely to harm competition.63  In doing so, the Avanci 5G 
58. See MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 3.
 59. See Sher, Lutinski & Tennis, supra note 35, at 121. 
60. See 3G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 1 n.2, 2.
 61. See Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 1. 
62. See id. at 3. 
63. Id. at 2.  Even though Avanci has been licensing its members’ 2G, 3G, and 4G 
wireless SEPs for the past few years, the DOJ concluded that Avanci’s 5G program 
constituted “proposed business conduct” appropriate for the business review letter process
because “no licensees are able to license 5G patents through the current 4G Platform and
[because] Avanci has represented that there are other differences in the licensing terms 
between the two programs that relate to royalty distribution and royalty reduction 
incentives for potential licensees.” Id. at 1 n.2.  However, throughout the letter, the DOJ 
frequently referred to Avanci’s existing 4G pool to support its conclusions.  See id. at 1– 
3, 16. Avanci also relied upon the 5G Business Review Letter in defending itself against 
antitrust claims concerning its 4G pool, further undermining the future nature of the 
conduct in question.  See Notice of Supplemental Authority for Defendant at 1, Cont’l 
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DOJ Business Review Letter failed to account for dramatic changes in the 
SEP licensing and assertion landscape.
When the prior DOJ Business Review Letters were issued around two 
decades ago, there was little guidance concerning how FRAND commitments 
limit the ways that SEP owners can seek to license and enforce their 
intellectual property. Since then, courts have held that, under certain 
circumstances, a SEP-holder’s refusal to comply with its FRAND obligation
may give rise to contract liability and distort the competitive process.64 
SEPs also are asserted on a much more frequent basis than at the time
the original letters were issued.  According to a 2017 study, SEPs are over 
four times as likely to be litigated as compared to non-SEPs.65  Moreover, 
because standardized technology has increasingly become prevalent in
recent years, the number of patents in SEP pools has increased exponentially. 
Whereas the original MPEG LA proposal for the MPEG-2 video compression
standard, analyzed in the Department’s 1997 business review letter, was 
for twenty-seven patents, by about decade later, the same pool had 800 
patents.66  Today, it has over a thousand patents.67  And the Avanci 5G 
pool is estimated to cover potentially over 30,000 patents.68 
The DOJ failed to take account of these important distinctions from the 
prior DOJ Business Review Letters in the Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review
Letter. A simple chart below illustrates some of the key differences from 
the MPEG LA pool and the Avanci 5G pool: 
Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci LLC, No. 3:19-cv-02933-M (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2020), ECF 
No. 302. For a further discussion of this case, see infra Section V.A. 
64. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313–14 (3d Cir. 
2007); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1046–47; Case C-170/13, Huawei 
Tech. Co. v. ZTE Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, ¶ 3 (July 16, 2015).  Despite these well-
reasoned opinions, starting in November 2017, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice reversed course and began a campaign questioning the role of antitrust in 
addressing FRAND violations. See John “Jay” Jurata, Jr. & Emily Luken, Out of Sync?: 
DOJ’s Policy Reversal Towards SEPs Lacks Legal Support, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 
(June 6, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/gcr-usa/out-of-sync-dojs-policy-
reversal-towards-seps-lacks-legal-support [https://perma.cc/N9WV-SR77]. The DOJ’s 
policy reversal is contrary to well-established precedent. See id. 
65. Rudi Bekkers et al., Disclosure Rules and Declared Essential Patents 21, 43 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23627, 2017), http://people.bu.edu/ 
tsimcoe/documents/working/dSEP7.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ45-UAH4].
66. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 68 n.62 (2007) 




67. See generally MPEG LA, MPEG-2 ATTACHMENT 1 (2020), https://www.
mpegla.com/wp-content/uploads/m2-att1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5KP-76F5].
68.  Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 3. 
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Identified No (only estimate of 
over 30,000 patents) 
IDENTIFICATION OF 
LICENSED PATENTS 
Patent list is 
available 




All licensed patents 
have been evaluated 
essential. 
One evaluated 
patent is enough to 




Royalty identified No 
OTHER TERMS OF 
ROYALTY 
Most favored nation 
guaranteed  
None 
Additionally, the Avanci pool—and the DOJ’s Business Review 
Letter—also departed from the earlier examples in that it expressly is limited 
to licensing only at the original equipment manufacturer level (OEM), i.e.,
automobiles.69  The DOJ acknowledged that Avanci’s license, by its own
terms, is limited to vehicles but concluded that this was unlikely to harm 
competition because, among other things, the license offers “have made” 
rights.70  However, the DOJ did not separately consider whether the refusal 
to license other willing licensees in the supply chain, such as component 
manufacturers, complied with the Avanci members’ obligation to license
their patents on FRAND terms.  In fact, the DOJ conceded that its analysis
would be different if certain facts arose; it observed that “[c]ompetitive 
concerns could arise if pool licensors collectively agreed not to license
outside the pool despite this safeguard, which would negate the benefits 
of independent licensing.”71  The DOJ also failed to consider how forcing 
licenses at the vehicle level deprives many of the efficiencies of the 
vertically disintegrated auto supply chain. 
69. See id. at 16. 
70. Id. at 16–17, 19. 
71. Id. at 17. 
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IV. SOME OF THE PROCOMPETITIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR PATENT 
POOLS ARE NO LONGER TRUE WHEN APPLIED
 TO FRAND-ENCUMBERED SEPS 
The historical DOJ Business Review Letters remain instructive on the 
application of antitrust law to patent pools composed of FRAND-
encumbered SEPs but, as discussed above, they were the product of a different
era in SEP licensing. The time has come to reassess the assumptions 
underlying the procompetitive nature of patent pools. This is both because 
(1) the changed market circumstances call into question the assumptions
of the original DOJ Business Review Letters, and (2) the Avanci 5G DOJ
Business Review Letter applied those assumptions without critically
examining them. Upon further examination, some of those assumptions 
no longer are true when applied to pools of SEPs subject to a FRAND 
commitment. 
A. Market Power 
The Guidelines and the historical DOJ Business Review Letters endorse 
the view that, provided a screening method for essentiality is in place,
pools of complementary patents generally are procompetitive because 
complementary patents do not lead to enhanced market power.  With the 
passage of time, at least four problems with that assumption have emerged, 
none of which were considered in the Avanci 5G Business Review Letter. 
First, the screening methods put into place by many pools do not appear 
to be effective. As explained in Section V.C below, the vast majority of SEPs 
that have been tested in court have been found to be either nonessential or 
invalid.  Such a high level of error strongly undermines the assumption that 
pools are limited to complementary patents and do not include substitute 
patents. Nonetheless, the Avanci 5G Business Review Letter repeatedly
emphasized how aggregating complementary patents is procompetitive 
and touted Avanci’s “evaluation” process without critical evaluation of 
how the patents owned by Avanci members fared when tested in court.72 
Second, even if limited to complementary patents, not all SEPs are 
necessary to practice a particular technical standard.  Many standards have 
optional portions that are not always implemented.73  Alternatively, some
standards have required portions that can be satisfied using alternative 
72. See id. at 8–9. 
73. See, e.g., Sacha Kavanagh, What Is Narrowband IoT?, 5G (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://5g.co.uk/guides/what-is-narrowband-iot [https://perma.cc/CMT3-MLA3]. For 
example, Narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT) is a Low Power Wide Area Network 
(LPWAN) radio technology standard that is a subset of the LTE standard because it only
uses a single narrow-band of 200kHz. See id. 
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options.74  Finally, the patented technology underlying a standard may be
specific to only a subset of devices that interoperate with the standard.75 
Third, the fact that SEPs are complementary does not mean that a pool
does not have increased market power relative to each of the SEP owners
individually.  SEP owners confer positive externalities on one another when 
raising prices. This is because when calculating reasonable royalties for 
patent infringement, significant weight often is placed on comparable licenses 
for similar patented technology—other licenses covering the same standard.76 
As a result, pools can allow SEP owners to internalize these “comparable 
externalities” by raising prices and collectively committing to a tough 
bargaining posture.  Whereas individual licensing arrangements help constrain 
the prices other SEP owners can charge, pool licensing arrangements can
sidestep that constraint.
At the time the historical DOJ Business Review Letters were published,
the importance of comparable licenses in determining reasonable royalty 
patent damages was far less than it is today.  At that time, licenses for 
similar technologies were just two of the fifteen factors for a Georgia-
Pacific reasonable royalty analysis.77  But over the past twenty years, the
relative role of comparable licenses in determining reasonable royalty patent 
damages has increased substantially: “As [the Federal Circuit] ha[s] held 
many times, using sufficiently comparable licenses is a generally reliable
method of estimating the value of a patent.”78  Although the Avanci 5G DOJ 
Business Review Letter acknowledged the importance of comparable 
74. See, e.g., COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 16–17 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2007). 
75. See, e.g., Cellular System, U.S. Patent No. 10,498,029 col. 18 (filed July 15, 
2019) (issued Dec. 3, 2019).  For example, some cellular SEPs describe functionality that
is implemented in cellular base stations, as opposed to handsets or similar devices. See, 
e.g., id.
 76. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
77. See Ga.–Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (setting forth the fifteen factors). 
78. Apple, Inc., 757 F.3d at 1325; see also Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 
F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  In more recent years, courts have noted correctly that
such licenses must not have been entered under duress, such as threat of injunction. See, 
e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *67
(W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 
9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *33 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 3, 2013). 
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licenses,79 it did not consider how this dynamic impacts the market power 
of SEPs relative to each other. The increasing reliance on comparable licenses 
shows how royalties charged for a subset of SEPs affect the royalties that
can be charged by other SEP-holders. 
Courts outside of the United States also place great weight on similar
license-based evidence when determining FRAND royalties.  For example, 
in Unwired Planet v. Huawei, the U.K. High Court of Justice (Patents) 
examined comparable licenses to adjudicate a FRAND royalty on a 
worldwide basis, while also performing a “top-down” methodology as a 
cross-check.80  Thus, even though no two SEPs may be substitutable to each 
other, royalties charged by one SEP owner affect the amount of royalties 
other SEP owners for the same standard are able to collect. 
Fourth, concerns over royalty stacking also create a competitive link 
between the licenses for multiple SEP owners within the same standard. 
Under the top-down methodology, the maximum aggregate royalty burden
for a particular standard is calculated and then allocated to a specific SEP-
holder’s proportional share of patents in the standard.81 This methodology
directly demonstrates how royalties charged by one SEP-holder may limit 
the ability of other SEP-holders to collect royalties in connection with the
same standard. 
Court cases adjudicating FRAND rates also confirm that concerns over 
the aggregate royalty stack serve as a competitive restraint on what individual
SEP owners can charge.  For example, in TCL v. Ericsson, the district court 
examined public statements made by Ericsson and other SEP-holders 
in press releases prior to the adoption of the relevant standards.82  Ericsson 
and others publicly expressed that they expected the aggregate maximum 
royalty to be in the single digits, around 5% for 2G and 3G, and between
6%–8%—or at least not higher than 10%—for 4G.83 The court “applie[d]
the 5% figure to 2G/3G, and applie[d] both 6% and 10% to 4G” as part of 
84 the top-down analysis.
79. Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 10 n.71 (quoting
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, HTC Corp. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson, No. 19–40566 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2019). 
80. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [178] 
(Eng.), aff’d, [2020] UKSC 37 [171]. 
81. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38–44. 
82. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. 
SACV 14-341 JVS(DFMx), 2017 WL 6611635, at *11–14 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017),
vacated on other grounds, 943 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
83. Id.
 84. Id. at *14. 
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B. Reduced Transaction Costs 
While patent pools can reduce transaction costs, that benefit is reduced
where multiple SEP pools arise from a single standard.85  Again, the historical 
DOJ Business Review Letters were the product of a time when few SEP
pools existed.86  Now, there are standards for which several pools exist,
increasing the risk of an excessive royalty stack. 
Multiple pools can lead to an excessive royalty stack because potential 
licensees making products that practice the standard may feel compelled
to obtain a license from each individual pool, as well as those SEP-holders 
that do not offer their patents through pools.  Under this scenario, SEP-
holders also may make duplicative royalty demands that fail to consider 
the aggregate royalty burden for a standard.87  More troubling, some of those
pools for the same standard have been alleged to contain overlapping patents,
leading to “double-dipping” by SEP-holders.88  The DOJ noted with approval
in the MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter how “[t]he list of Portfolio 
patents attached to the Portfolio license will provide licensees with information
they need to assess the merits of the Portfolio license.”89  But now, with 
SEP-holders establishing multiple pools for overlapping standards, the
efficiencies achieved in terms of purportedly reducing transaction costs
are lessened, and licensees are at a greater risk of having to pay aggregate
royalties in excess of FRAND.
A classic example of this problem can be seen with the H.265/High 
Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) standard.  Unlike many other standards, 
HEVC has three different patent pools: (1) the MPEG LA pool; (2) the 
HEVC Advance pool; and (3) the Velos Media pool.  The three pools differ 
as follows: 
85.  1999 DVD DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 10–12. 
86. See Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent Pools, 27 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 421, 439–40 (2014). 
87. FAIR STANDARDS ALL., PATENT POOLS AND LICENSING PLATFORMS IN SEP 
LICENSING 2 (2019) [hereinafter FSA PAPER], https://fair-standards.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/191104_FSA_Position_Patent_Pools.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS2G-J5ZP]. 
 88. As described infra in this section, there have been allegations that the HEVC
Advance pool contains patents that are also already included in the MPEG LA pool for the 
same H.265/HEVC standard. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 





 The MPEG LA pool came into existence in 2014.90  It  
generally follows the structure of MPEG LA’s earlier video 
codec pools.91  MPEG LA’s royalty rate is $0.20 per unit—
royalty free for the first 100,000 units—with an annual cap
of $25 million.92  It has over forty licensors93 and over 300 
licensees.94 
 The HEVC Advance pool was formed in 2015.95  HEVC 
Advance’s rates range from $0.20 per unit to $1.60 per unit
depending on the country, profile, and device, and there are 
also annual caps that differ according to various criteria.96 
It has over thirty licensors97 and over 180 licensees.98 
 The Velos Media pool was formed in 2017.99  Velos Media 
has not disclosed publicly its royalty rates, but there have 
been reports that the rates are over $1.00 per unit with no 
90.  Press Release, MPEG LA, MPEG LA Offers HEVC Patent Portfolio License 1 
(Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.mpegla.com/wp-content/uploads/n-14-09-29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GS6S-UPF7].
91. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *82 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“[T]he evidence before the court is clear: 
the MPEG LA H.264 patent pool has achieved widespread adoption of the H.264 
Standard.”).
92. MPEG LA, HEVC PATENT PORTFOLIO LICENSE BRIEFING 7 (2020), https:// 
www.mpegla.com/wp-content/uploads/HEVCweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8CH-QQ6Z]. 
93. See HEVC: Licensors, MPEG LA, https://www.mpegla.com/programs/hevc/
licensors/ [https://perma.cc/K8C5-8G6V].
94. HEVC: Licensees and Affiliates in Good Standing, MPEG LA, https://www.
mpegla.com/programs/hevc/licensees/ [https://perma.cc/JCF7-JCDA].
95. Press Release, HEVC Advance, HEVC Advance Launches to Rally Critical
Mass of Stakeholders to Deliver Next Generation Video Experiences 1 (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://accessadvance.com/hevc-advance-launches-to-rally-critical-mass-of-stakeholders-
to-deliver-next-generation-video-experiences/ [https://perma.cc/Z55L-DRU5].
96. See HEVC ADVANCE, ROYALTY RATE STRUCTURE FOR HEVC ADVANCE LICENSEES 
2–4 (2020), https://www.hevcadvance.com/pdfnew/RoyaltyRatesSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z5D5-BEXS]. 
97. See HEVC ADVANCE, LICENSOR LIST 2–4 (2020), https://www.hevcadvance.
com/pdfnew/LicensorList.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BNN-BMG8].
98. HEVC ADVANCE, LICENSEE LIST 2–10 (2020), https://accessadvance.com/pdfnew/
LicenseeList.pdf [https://perma.cc/39YY-TE62]. 
99. Velos Media Launches New Licensing Platform to Drive Adoption of Latest
Video Technologies, Improve Consumer Viewing Experiences, VELOS MEDIA (Mar. 31, 2017), 
http://velosmedia.com/2017/03/ [https://perma.cc/3XSR-TGS2]. 
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caps.100  It has six licensors101 and an unknown number of 
licensees—unlike the other two pools, Velos Media does 
not make this information publicly available. 
An entity making devices that practice the H.265 standard, such as
smartphones, laptops, or televisions, therefore would need to pay royalty 
fees up to over $2.70 per unit for all three pools—and that is before 
accounting for SEP licenses for patent holders who license outside of 
those pools, such as Nokia and InterDigital.102  In contrast, an independent
study estimated that the total per unit royalty for the entire H.265 standard 
should be no more than $0.28 per unit, based on, among other things, the 
diminishing value of storage and bandwidth.103  Even worse, there have 
been allegations that the HEVC Advance pool contains patents that are 
also already included in the MPEG LA pool, and that HEVC Advance does
not provide for discounts or rebates to offset these overlapping patents.104 
The presence of multiple pools for a single standard, like with H.265, 
strips away some of the benefits from reducing transaction costs and 
contributes to a high royalty stack.  To be fair, from a logistical and time-
management perspective, it is still easier for licensees to negotiate with 
multiple pools than all the individual patent holders.  But because the 
administrative benefits are fewer than negotiating with a single pool, there 
is an increased chance that the anticompetitive effects resulting from
certain practices of each pool will outweigh their procompetitive benefits. 
100. Independent Economic Study Suggests HEVC Royalties Should Be Comparable to
or Less than Rates for AVC, UNIFIED PATENTS (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.unifiedpatents.
com/insights/2019/1/9/independent-economic-study-suggests-hevc-royalties-should-be-
comparable-to-or-less-than-rates-for-avc [https://perma.cc/AJ4T-SSAK] [hereinafter Study, 
UNIFIED PATENTS].
101. A Holistic Approach to Licensing, VELOS MEDIA, http://velosmedia.com/licensing/ 
[https://perma.cc/4A95-L76P].
102. See Study, UNIFIED PATENTS, supra note 100. 
103. See id.
 104. See Sophie Lawrance & Matthew Hunt, FRAND in the UK (March 2019 Edition): 
PanOptis Takes on Apple; Vestel Issues Antitrust Litigation Against HEVC Patent Pool; 





V. ANTICOMPETITIVE RISKS OF CERTAIN SEP POOLS ARE HIGHER 
TODAY COMPARED TO THE POOLS REVIEWED BY THE DOJ 
IN HISTORICAL BUSINESS REVIEW LETTERS 
Because the SEP licensing and assertion landscape is quite different
today than it was when the prior DOJ Business Review Letters were issued 
—which the Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter did not consider— 
the anticompetitive risks of certain SEP pools are greater than previously
realized. In particular, more aggressive pool licensing practices that have 
come about in recent years fall into this category, such as (a) licensing
agents refusing to comply with FRAND commitments made by the pool’s 
members; (b) mechanisms designed to deter adhering to FRAND commitments,
such as restricting the entities that can be licensed within an industry, or
structuring the pool in a way that deters individual licensing by pool 
members; (c) including non-SEPs to collect supra-FRAND royalties; and
(d) the now widespread practice of unbundling SEP portfolios and transferring
parts of the portfolio to multiple entities, who then collectively seek a 
higher royalty than before. 
A. Licensing Agents Refusing to Comply with FRAND 
A commitment to license on FRAND terms is not limited to the original 
patent holder who participated in the SSO’s standard-making process.  It 
also extends to subsequent owners of the patent as well as other entities
who license on behalf of the SEP-holder, such as a pool licensing agent.105 
Indeed, any other rule would simply allow SEP-holders to circumvent the 
FRAND commitments required by the SSO’s IPR policies by transferring 
their SEPs to another entity after standardization.106 
105. See, e.g., Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at 
*9–10 (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach 
to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1135, 1158–59 (2013). 
106. As a result, many SEP pools state that they comply with the FRAND commitment. 
See, e.g., How We Work, SISVEL, https://www.sisvel.com/about-us/how-we-work [https:// 
perma.cc/F8MY-2CKV] (“Sisvel is committed to treating all companies fairly and as 
equals by licensing standard-essential patents on FRAND terms and conditions.”); Q&A, 
VELOS MEDIA, http://velosmedia.com/technology/q-and-a/ [https://perma.cc/53C7-48HC]
(“We will license on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms . . . .”); About, 
VIA LICENSING, https://www.via-corp.com/about/#overview [https://perma.cc/3GG3-W59Z]
(“Via’s flexible solutions build upon the traditional patent pool model to provide private, 
multi-polar IP licensing solutions that address today’s complex IP market.  Some benefits of 
these fair, reasonable and transparent offerings include . . . [omitted listed items.]”); FAQs – 
We’re Doing Things in a New Way, AVANCI, https://www.avanci.com/marketplace/#li-
faqs [https://perma.cc/8U6W-JWU4] (responding to the question “Is Avanci licensing on
FRAND terms?” with “Absolutely.  Avanci shares a commitment with the IoT ecosystem to 
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When push comes to shove and potential licensees seek to hold licensing 
agents to the FRAND promises of their members, some SEP pools have 
taken the position that, as long as the individual members make SEPs 
available for license individually, there is no obligation for the pool to do 
so. In other words, they claim the pool is offered for convenience, and 
entities unhappy with the pool’s rates are free to negotiate with individual 
members. 
For example, Continental Automotive Systems, a leading supplier of
automotive components, filed a 2019 lawsuit against the Avanci pool and
several of its members in connection with 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs—which 
the DOJ asserted was not the licensing program that was the subject of the 
Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter.107  In its complaint, Continental
alleged, among other things, that Avanci licenses only automotive manufacturers
and refuses to license upstream suppliers like Continental.108  In seeking
to dismiss Continental’s complaint, Avanci claimed that “Continental . . . 
[c]annot [p]lead [f]acts to [e]stablish that Avanci [i]s [c]ontractually
[o]bligated to [o]ffer FRAND [r]ates to [t]hird-[p]arty [b]eneficiaries.”109 
Avanci further claimed that Continental’s breach of contract claims must 
fail because they “are based on alleged FRAND commitments that the
SEP owners—not Avanci—made to various SSOs.”110  Similar statements 
were made by Avanci during a status conference in early 2020.111  Although 
the district court dismissed Continental’s antitrust claims in September 
make the latest technology available in a way that is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
(FRAND).”); see also Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 20 
(“Avanci represents that its current rates for the 4G Platform are FRAND and reflect input 
from both licensors and licensees, and that Avanci intends its 5G rates also to be 
FRAND.”). However, as described further in this section, Avanci otherwise claimed it cannot 
be held legally accountable for alleged breaches of FRAND. 
107. As discussed supra, this did not stop Avanci from pointing to the DOJ 5G Business 
Review Letter as “supplemental authority” for its motion to dismiss Continental’s antitrust 
claims.  See Notice of Supplemental Authority for Defendant, supra note 63, at 1. 
108. Complaint at 29, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci LLC, No. 3:19-cv-02933-M 
(N.D. Tex. May 10, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
109. Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 
27, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-02933-M (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 
2020), ECF No. 270. 
110. Id.
 111. See Transcript of Rule 16 Conference at 32–33, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, 
LLC, Case No. 3:19-cv-02933-M (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2020). 
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2020 for lack of standing, the court did not consider whether Avanci was 
legally obligated to comply with FRAND.112 
These statements disavowing a FRAND obligation are troubling.  Without 
the ability to enforce the FRAND commitments of the pool’s membership
against the pool itself, there is no way for potential licensees to test the 
“FRAND-lyness” of the pool’s royalties.113  This would allow the pool to
charge aggregate royalties in excess of FRAND—effectively evading its 
members’ individual obligations to license on FRAND terms—and then 
coordinate with its members to deter bilateral licensing on FRAND terms.
More on how this can occur is addressed below. 
B. Structural Mechanisms Designed to Deter Adherence 
to FRAND Commitments 
In addition to licensing agents refusing to comply with the FRAND
commitments of their members—including the original owners of those 
patents—the governing documents for some pools increasingly are placing 
restrictions that deter the pool and individual members from licensing
those SEPs on FRAND terms. 
First, some SEP pools contractually are prohibited by their members from 
licensing different levels of the supply chain and instead must license only 
manufacturers of end-user devices. Most end-user devices practicing
standardized technologies are the product of a multi-step supply chain. 
Often the component that first practices the standardized technology is 
much further upstream than the consumer-facing end product.  By limiting
licensing exclusively to the end-user device level, pool members collectively 
agree to try to charge royalties against the most expensive product in the 
value chain—automobiles; refrigerators—even though the SEPs first are 
practiced in components further upstream—chipsets.  Such behavior is a 
collective agreement to circumvent the IPR policies of certain SSOs114 
and could violate both the reasonable and nondiscriminatory prongs of 
112. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, No. 3:19-cv-02933-M, 2020 WL 5627224 
(N.D. Tex. Sep. 10, 2020). 
113.  For example, even though Avanci represents on its website that it “shares a 
commitment . . . to make the latest standard wireless technology available in a way that is
fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory,” FAQs, supra note 106, Avanci otherwise publicly
disavows that it can be held to the FRAND commitment originally made by its SEP-holder 
members, or that its compliance with that commitment can be tested in a court of law. See 
supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
114. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012) (“SSOs . . . 
require[e] members who hold IP rights in standard-essential patents to agree to license
those patents to all comers on terms that are ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory,’ or ‘RAND.’” 
(emphasis added)). 
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FRAND.115  Indeed, the 1997 MPEG LA DOJ Business Review letter 
approvingly found that the pool did not appear to “disadvantage particular 
licensees” because of the commitment to “nondiscriminatory Portfolio 
licensing.”116 
For example, the Avanci platform mentioned above charges its royalties 
on a per vehicle basis.117  Additionally, the Avanci membership agreement 
specifically restricts the licensing of upstream products by Avanci—the
components that enable the practice of the SEPs in the vehicle.118  But there 
is nothing different about the underlying licensed standardized wireless 
communications technology—2G, 3G, 4G—when it is used in a vehicle 
as opposed to the upstream components that actually implement that 
technology.  The same is true with respect to other connected IoT devices 
that will soon be the targets of 5G licensing demands from SEP pools. 
It is particularly curious that the DOJ’s Avanci 5G Business Review
Letter did not find this aspect objectionable.  Like the existing Avanci 
wireless SEP program, Avanci intends to license 5G SEPs only to car 
115. See id. at 874, 884 (A FRAND promise to “grant a license to an unrestricted
number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms
and conditions to use the patented material necessary . . . admits of no limitations as to 
who or how many applicants could receive a license . . . .”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To mitigate the risk that a SEP holder will
extract more than the fair value of its patented technology, many SDOs require SEP holders to
agree to license their patents on ‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’ or ‘RAND’ terms. 
Under these agreements, an SEP holder cannot refuse a license to a manufacturer who commits 
to paying the RAND rate.”).
116.  MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 10. 
117. Pricing, AVANCI, https://www.avanci.com/marketplace/#li-pricing [https://perma.cc/ 
FRQ4-8S5L].
118. According to the IoT Platform Master License Management Agreement, Avanci is 
granted “limited authority (i.e., in respect of certain field of use restrictions), to act as [an]
agent to license” 2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs on behalf of the member licensors.  See Internet of 
Things (“IoT”) Platform Master License Management Agreement at 4, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 
Qualcomm, No. 5:17-cv-00220-LHK (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2019), ECF No. 1306 [hereinafter
Avanci Management Agreement] (pinpoint citation is to the ECF page number). This 
“limited authority” is further illustrated by the template patent licenses incorporated in the
main Agreement, which expressly limit “Licensed Products”—the only products subject 
to the License Grant—to “Vehicles” (as defined in the agreement). See id. at 33 (definition 
of “Licensed Products” under the 2G/3G patent license); id. at 33–34 (definition of 
“Vehicles” under the 2G/3G patent license); id. at 35 (2G/3G License Grant); id. at 58 
(definition of “Licensed Products” under the 2G/3G/4G patent license); id. at 58–59 (definition 
of “Vehicles” under the 2G/3G/4G patent license); id. at 60 (2G/3G/4G License Grant). 
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manufacturers.119  The DOJ acknowledged that this was a “different approach” 
for patent licensing in the automotive sector where “vehicle manufacturers 
are often indemnified by their suppliers for intellectual property 
infringement.”120  However, the DOJ failed to consider how Avanci’s 
refusal to license further upstream results in numerous inefficiencies that
harm competition.  For example, OEMs are forced to retain or otherwise 
occupy engineering resources duplicative of their suppliers to properly
evaluate and value the SEPs at issue. Upstream licensing would also be
more efficient in light of the number of smaller suppliers upstream and
better understanding of the value of the technology at issue.  Refusing
licenses to non-OEMs thus forces the entire auto supply chain “to take on
unnecessary transaction costs in order to obtain a license[,]” which consumers 
ultimately pay.121 And coercing non-OEMs to rely on indirect “have-
made” rights further harms innovation by increasing costs for component 
manufacturers, fracturing their economies of scale.122 
Second, and relatedly, the governing documents for some SEP pools are 
structured in a manner that deters, if not renders impracticable, individual 
licensing.  Those documents—which again represent a collective agreement 
amongst the pool’s members—sometimes contain “carrots and sticks” 
regarding individual infringement litigation initiated by pool members. 
Such provisions encourage individual members to pursue infringement
litigation with the goal of settling that litigation with a license to the entire 
pool, such as agreeing to reimburse litigation costs when individual 
infringement actions result in a license to the pool. Under this scenario, 
an individual pool member can seek an injunction based on a handful, or
even one, strong patent(s) to coerce the infringement defendant to take a 
license to the entire pool of much weaker patents, and then be reimbursed
for its litigation costs as plaintiff.123  Pools also may require that any
individual licenses entered outside of the pool do not decrease the rates 
119. See 5G Licensing for Connected Vehicles, AVANCI, https://www.avanci.com/5g 
[https://perma.cc/C2KZ-PV3V].
120.  Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 21. 
121. Brief of Amici Curiae Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. et al. in Support 
of the Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 16, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 969 
F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122), ECF No. 263. 
122. See Press Release, Fair Standards All., Fair Standard Alliance Statement re U.S. 
Department of Justice Business Review Letter on Avanci’s 5G Patent Pool 5 (Sept. 1, 
2020), https://fair-standards.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/200901-FSA-Statement-re-
Avanci-BRL.pdf [https://perma.cc/C35D-2W2M]. 
123. See, e.g., Via Announces Settlement with Vestel, BUS. WIRE (Jul. 18, 2016, 9:00
AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160718005222/en/Announces-Settlement-
Vestel [https://perma.cc/CE2F-73CW] (describing how Vestel signed a patent license with
the Via pool for its advanced audio coding pool after four separate pool members sued a 
Vestel subsidiary for infringement and sought injunctions in Germany). 
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the pools charge, again decreasing the incentive of members to enter into 
individual licenses—especially those that would effectively compete with 
the royalty rates being charged by the pool.  In both cases, the procompetitive
safeguard noted in the DOJ Business Review Letters—that patents remain
available for licensing outside of the pool—is eroded.124 
Again, the Avanci membership agreement is instructive.  According to 
the IoT Platform Master License Management Agreement for 2G, 3G, and 
4G, Avanci as the licensing agent can exercise its own discretion to notify 
the member licensors that a particular company is an “Unwilling Licensee.”125 
If a member licensor, or a group of member licensors, brings an infringement
action against a company that Avanci has designated an “Unwilling Licensee,” 
Avanci may reimburse the member licensor’s litigation costs.126 However, 
repayment is contingent upon the member licensor settling the litigation 
by convincing the “Unwilling Licensee” to enter into the Avanci pool-
wide license, as opposed to a bilateral agreement, in which case the litigation 
costs will not be reimbursed.127  Avanci also will reimburse the litigation 
costs of multiple members against a single OEM, provided at least one of 
those litigations result in a pool license.128 
The Avanci 5G program will function similarly in that “licensors that
sue for patent infringement of an essential patent may request reimbursement
of costs if the litigation results in a Platform license.”129  The DOJ’s approval 
of this structure was predicated on the absence of evidence suggesting that 
“pool licensors collectively agreed not to license outside the pool despite 
this safeguard.”130 
But real world events show how such structural incentives play out in 
practice, which are consistent with an agreement to limit licensing outside 
of the pool.  Between April 2019 and October 2019, three Avanci members 
—Conversant, Nokia and Sharp—filed nineteen separate infringement 
124. See FTC & DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 66, at 80 (“A competitive concern 
would arise, however, if decisions on licensing outside a pool were part of a concerted 
attempt by the pool’s licensors to hinder the ability of others (outside the pool) to offer a
competitive product or process.”). 
125. See Avanci Management Agreement, supra note 118, at 13. 
126. See id. at 14. 
127. See id.
 128. See id. at 14–15. 
129.  Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 6. 
130. See id. at 17. 
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actions against the same automotive manufacturer, Daimler, in Germany.131 
At least one of those members informed Daimler in writing that, to resolve 
its lawsuits, Daimler needs to enter a license with Avanci.132 
A similar coordinated attack by Avanci appears to have succeeded
against Tesla. Between December 2019 and September 2020, five Avanci 
members launched infringement actions against Tesla around the world. 
These include two actions brought by Sisvel in federal court in Delaware;133 
an action brought by Sharp in Tokyo District court in Japan;134 two actions 
brought by Conversant in federal court in Texas;135 one action brought by
Conversant in the Mannheim Regional Court in Germany;136 and one 
action brought by Unwired Planet and Optis in federal court in Texas.137 
In March 2021, all of the actions in federal court had been stipulated 
by the parties to be dismissed.138  Although there has been no public
announcement, the simultaneous dismissal of those actions strongly
suggests that Tesla has entered into a license with Avanci. 
In the absence of a coordinated campaign—which even the Avanci 5G
DOJ Business Review Letter noted would trigger competitive concerns—
these serial attacks likely would not occur.  The apparent Tesla settlement
is the quintessential example of how competitors in an IP licensing market
are now coordinating litigation strategy to pressure potential licensees to
coerce pool licensing. 
131. See Florian Mueller, Munich Court Schedules First Hearings in Two Sharp v.
Daimler Patent Cases for Late November, Another Anti-Antisuit Hearing for Early October, 
FOSS PATENTS (Sept. 12, 2019), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/09/munich-court-schedules-
first-hearings.html [https://perma.cc/F3KU-43RE]; Florian Mueller, Conversant Joins Fellow 
Avanci Contributors Nokia and Sharp in Suing Daimler, Asserting Former Nokia Patent
in Munich, FOSS PATENTS (Oct. 8, 2019), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/10/conversant-
joins-fellow-avanci.html [https://perma.cc/6SK4-MHDF].
132. First Amended Complaint at 45, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci LLC, Case 
No. 3:19-cv-02933-M (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2019). 
133. Case Nos. 1:19-cv-02288 and 1:20-cv-00655, see Florian Mueller, Patent Troll 
Sisvel Files Second Case Against Tesla in Delaware, Asserting Nine Standard-essential Patents
from Nokia, LG, and BlackBerry, FOSS PATENTS (May 18, 2020), http://www.fosspatents.com/ 
2020/05/patent-troll-sisvel-files-second-case.html [https://perma.cc/S6C5-YE8B]. 
134. Florian Mueller, Avanci Conflict With Tesla Escalates as Nokia-Fed Patent 




135.  Case Nos. 6:20-cv-00323 and 6:20-cv-00324, W.D. Tex.
 136. Mueller, supra note 134. 
137.  Case No. 2:20-cv-310 in E.D. Tex. 
138. Florian Mueller, Three Fateful Decisions Will Drive Up Tesla’s Patent Licensing 
Costs: Avanci License, Austin Factory, and German Gigafactory, FOSS PATENTS (Mar. 22, 
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The restraints described above either require or incentivize behavior
that is inconsistent with the FRAND commitment attached to the SEPs in 
the pool. This failure to adhere to FRAND can and does lead to anticompetitive 
harm139 in the form of royalty prices untethered to the value of technology, 
which, in turn, threatens to cause companies making innovative devices—
and their suppliers—to invest substantially fewer resources in research 
and development, among other things.140 
C. Including Non-SEPs to Collect Supra-FRAND Royalties 
Another prominent problem is the inclusion of large numbers of nonessential 
patents in SEP pools.  The DOJ Business Review Letters emphasized how 
the portfolios at issue were limited to technically essential patents, which
mitigates against anticompetitive risk.141 The Department also relied on
the statutory presumption that issued patents are valid.142  However, the 
practice of including invalid and nonessential patents in SEP pools is far
more widespread than previously thought.  SSOs do not independently verify 
whether a declared SEP is in fact essential to a standard.  Instead, SSOs 
simply ask that patent holders unilaterally declare patents they believe to 
be essential, or that may become essential, before the standard is finalized.
SEP-holders are therefore incentivized to over-declare patents,143 both to 
maximize royalties and to err on the side of caution because of the potential 
penalties associated with not declaring a patent later found to be essential. 
The overwhelming majority of SEPs, when tested in court, are found to 
be invalid, not essential, or not infringed.  A 2013 study by one of this 
139. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F3.d 297, 313–14 (3d Cir.
2007); U-blox AG v. InterDigital, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-001-CAB-(BLM), 2019 WL 1574322, 
at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2019); Microsoft Mobile Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-723-
RGA, 2016 WL 1464545, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016). 
140. For example, Continental and Denso, automotive suppliers who seek wireless 
communications SEPs for inclusion of devices they make in vehicles, have had to forgo 
innovations because of the inability to obtain FRAND licenses from SEP-holders.  See 
Brief of Amici Curiae Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. and Denso Corporation in
Support of Appellee Federal Trade Commission at 10, 12, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, 
Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-16122), ECF No. 162, http://cdn.ca9.uscourts. 
gov/datastore/general/2020/02/27/19-16122-Continental%20Automotive%20Systems% 
20amicus%20brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/S99Q-WB5K]. 
141. See MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 10, 15; Avanci 5G 
DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 15. 
142. FTC & DOJ 2007 REPORT, supra note 66, at 71 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282). 
143.  Bekkers et al., supra note 65, at 21. 
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Article’s authors examined eighty-five adjudicated SEPs asserted by the 
three most litigious SEP owners between 2009 and 2013.144  Revealingly,
that study found that only one out of every eight SEPs tested in court was 
found valid and technically essential to practice the standard.145  In other 
words, only twelve percent of the supposedly “crown jewel” SEPs that
were hand-selected by litigation counsel succeeded when tested in court. 
A later study by this Article’s authors from 2013 to 2017 included a 
similar analysis and likewise found that just eleven percent of SEPs 
originally asserted during that period were found valid and infringed.146 
This success rate is far less than the litigation success rate for non-SEPs.147 
The failure rate for alleged SEPs is alarming. If most of the patents in 
SEP pools are not necessary to practice the standard, it increases the likelihood 
that the pool contains substitute patents.148  The primary concern regarding 
pools, set forth in the DOJ’s Business Review Letters, is the elimination 
of competition between substitute technologies.149 
Additionally, including substantial numbers of nonessential patents in 
SEP pools allows SEP owners to extract supra-FRAND royalties from 
licensees.  When justifying the royalties charged by their pools, many licensing 
agents tout the large number of SEPs contained therein.  A recent press 
release from one major pool illustrates this point: 
We are also extremely proud to now have 29 Licensors in our program, with 
collectively over 10,700 patents . . . . Our successful and continuing efforts to 
consolidate a substantial majority of the HEVC/H.265 patent landscape provides 
144. JOHN (“JAY”) JURATA, JR. & DAVID B. SMITH, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, TURNING 




 146. MATTHEW G. ROSE, JAY JURATA & EMILY LUKEN, E-COMPETITIONS, NO. 84684, 
“BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE”: UNWIRED PLANET V. HUAWEI AND THE DANGEROUS 
IMPLICATIONS OF WORLDWIDE FRAND LICENSES 5–6 (2017), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
cdn.orrick.com/files/eCompetitionsAugust2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE8C-EVD2]. 
147.  Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-Essential 
Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 608 (2019). 
148. In addition to problems with essentiality and validity, patents in pools may also 
be unenforceable due to implied waiver. Implied waiver occurs when the patentee’s “conduct
was so inconsistent with an intent to enforce its rights as to induce a reasonable belief that
such right has been relinquished.”  Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 645 F.3d 
1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 
1020 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  In a recent decision, the Federal Circuit endorsed the idea that 
breach of duty of disclosure to a SSO may constitute implied waiver, while leaving it to
the district court to determine whether the doctrine applied.  Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. 
v. Apple Inc., 899 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
149. See MPEG LA DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 10 (“The continuing
role of an independent expert to assess essentiality is an especially effective guarantor that
the Portfolio patents are complements, not substitutes.”). 
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unmatched and unprecedented value to both our licensors and licensees, and we 
look forward to delivering even greater value by collaborating with additional 
patent owners who are still considering their options regarding their HEVC essential 
patents.150 
But if most of those patents are not necessary to practice the standard, 
then SEP pool owners are able to evade their FRAND commitments by 
using large numbers of unnecessary patents to collect royalties in excess 
of FRAND. 
The One-Monopoly-Rent-Theorem does not affect this reality. That 
theorem states that, when certain conditions are met,151 a monopolist is
unable to increase overall prices by tying a monopolized product with a 
second, more competitive product.152  This is because increasing the price
of the otherwise competitive product would reduce the demand for the 
combined bundle.153  Implicitly relying on this theory, the Federal Circuit, 
in U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission, noted that a patent 
owner is not capable of increasing the royalties it collects by bundling 
essential and nonessential patents.154  But a critical assumption underlying 
the One-Monopoly-Rent-Theorem is that one of the products is being 
supplied at a monopoly price.155  Indeed, the essential patents at issue in 
the Philips case did not arise from a formal standards-setting process and 
were not subject to FRAND promises by their owners.156  But the vast majority
of SEPs, which are encumbered by FRAND commitments, are prohibited 
from being supplied at a monopoly price. The FRAND promise is designed
precisely to avoid this outcome, reassuring potential adopters of the standard 
that they need not assume this risk.157 In other words, the FRAND promise 
is designed to place limits on “charg[ing] what the market will bear,” and 
150. HEVC Advance Passes 10,000 Patent Milestone – Announces Toshiba Corp. Joins 
as Licensor, YAHOO! FIN. (Mar. 30, 2020) (emphasis added), https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
news/hevc-advance-passes-10-000-043200988.html [https://perma.cc/MYS6-D5DU].
151. Those conditions are (1) the two goods are consumed in fixed proportions; (2) 
the one good is supplied by a monopolist; and (3) the other good is in a competitive market. 
See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 31 (2008); see generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and 
the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009) (discussing 
the assumptions required for the single monopoly profit theory). 
152. See Elhauge, supra note 151, at 403. 
153. See id. 
154.  424 F.3d 1179, 1191–92 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
155. See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 151, at 31. 
156. See U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1184, 1188. 
157. See Contreras, supra note 20, at 42. 
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“whatever maximum amount a willing licensee is able to pay,”158 in favor 
of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory royalties.159  As a result, and 
similar to other examples where the One-Monopoly-Rent-Theorem does
not apply,160 SEP pools are able to charge for unnecessary non-SEPs to
obtain supra-FRAND royalties on their necessary SEPs.161 
D. Using Pools to Exploit Unbundled SEP Portfolios 
Unbundling is the act of breaking up a previously intact SEP-portfolio 
and distributing portions of it to other entities, such as pools, PAEs, or
both, while retaining an interest in revenues generated by those other 
entities through assertion and licensing activities.162  Unbundling can be
used as a mechanism to evade the FRAND commitment because, once a 
portfolio is unbundled, the resulting SEP-holders collectively can charge
more in royalties than likely would have been possible absent the unbundling, 
or if the amount is greater than what a single licensor could have charged. 
For example, when Nokia decided to exit the mobile phone business 
following slumping sales, it decided to monetize its patent portfolio by
transferring some of its SEPs to two PAEs that went on an aggressive
campaign to extract exorbitant royalties from companies making devices
implementing cellular standards.163  Nokia and the PAEs, allegedly acting
at Nokia’s behest, could collectively seek more royalties in the aggregate 
than Nokia could have done with its unbundled portfolio.  In another 
example, the PAE IP Edge acquired thirty patents from Siemens in 2018 
and then asserted the portfolio through a series of lawsuits by plaintiff Q3 
158. U.S. Philips Corp., 424 F.3d at 1191–92. 
159. The presence of the FRAND commitment also addresses the Philips court’s 
concern that patents that are not presently essential may become essential. See id. Under 
the applicable IPR policies of most SSOs, patent holders are required to submit FRAND 
declarations for any patents that may become essential.  See, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, 
PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 38 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill 
eds., 2013).
160. See Elhauge, supra note 153, at 400–02, 404, 419. 
161. For this reason, Saint Lawrence Communications LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 
which applied Philips and subsequent cases to reject a misuse defense on a SEP-holder’s 
insistence of worldwide licenses of FRAND-encumbered SEPs, was decided incorrectly. 
No. 2:15-CV-351-JRG, 2018 WL 915125 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2018). 
162. See generally Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463 (2014) (discussing the advantages of different types of patent 
acquisitions).
163. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 2–3, Apple, Inc. v. Acacia Rsch. Corp., No.
5:16-cv-07266 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016), 2016 WL 7403907. 
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Networking LLC in both federal court and the International Trade 
Commission.164 
A simple illustration demonstrates how unbundling can lead to higher 
royalties. As part of its antitrust consent decree with the DOJ, IBM agreed
to license any patents necessary to interoperate with its mainframe computers 
on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis.165  Five years later, after 
expiration of those provisions, IBM voluntarily continued those patent licensing
practices.166  Under that voluntary program, IBM charged royalty rates of
one percent of the selling price for each patent used, up to a maximum of 
five percent of the selling price, for each licensed product.167  Under this 
framework, IBM offered a portfolio of thousands of patents for the same 
price it charged for licensing five patents.168  Why?  The answer is obvious: 
IBM recognized that once a certain royalty threshold was met, companies 
would not pay more to obtain a license to the additional patents in its 
portfolio.
Now consider what would have happened had IBM broken that same 
portfolio into multiple sub-parts.  Each of the entities licensing those subsets 
of patents would be incentivized to obtain the maximum amount of royalties
for each subset of patents, without adequately accounting for the aggregate 
royalty.  Likewise, unlike the scenario where potential licensees were
negotiating with IBM, the licensees would not have insight into the ultimate
number of patents they need to license and thus would not benefit from 
assessing the value of the full unaggregated portfolio.169  This risk is even 
greater when there is a lack of transparency in such unbundling efforts.170 
164. IP Edge Files ITC Complaint, Breaking Form in Latest Campaign Over Portfolio
of Former Siemens Patents, RPX INSIGHT (Sept. 27. 2020), https://insight.rpxcorp.com/
news/63866-ip-edge-files-itc-complaint-breaking-form-in-latest-campaign-over-portfolio-of-
former-siemens-patents [https://perma.cc/C5CG-C22X].
165. Consent Decree, United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 72-344 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956), http://www.cptech.org/at/ibm/ibm1956cd.html [https://perma.cc/2JRX-6G4V]. 
166. See Peter C. Grindley and David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing 
and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 14, 37 n.28 
(1997).
167. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 1913, 1962 n.163 (2003); IBM Policies & Principles, IBM, https://www.ibm.org/ 
responsibility/policies [https://perma.cc/Q6HV-3VW6].
168. See Teece & Sherry, supra note 167, at 1962. 
169. See generally Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent 
Assertion Entities, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445 (2014) (discussing the antitrust advantages and 
disadvantages to aggregated patent portfolios).
170. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 162, at 476. 
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Unbundling can also take the form of a SEP-holder joining a pool to 
license some of its SEPs through the pool as an agent, while also transferring 
ownership of other SEPs to the pool’s licensing agent. For example, at 
least some of the SEPs in the Velos Media H.265/HEVC pool are owned
by Velos Media itself—and were transferred to Velos by members of that
pool.171  A pool structured in this manner is designed to discourage licensing
with individual pool members because the potential licensee would have 
to negotiate with two entities, including the pool administrator, if it
wishes to license the prebundled portfolio of any particularly strong pool 
member. Not only does the unbundling require a separate transaction to
obtain a license to the preunbundled portfolio of any individual member, 
but the licensing agent has a strong incentive to hold out for a license to
all of the SEPs transferred to it—as opposed to limiting the license to only
patents transferred by that one individual member.  Again, the DOJ Business
Review Letters emphasized the importance of the patents in the pool being 
available for licensing outside of the pool, which is increasingly difficult
when a portfolio is unbundled this way.172 
Unbundling presents anticompetitive risks because it can result in licensees
paying for pool licenses they otherwise would not need or desire.  Given 
the fact, discussed above, that most alleged SEPs are neither essential nor 
valid,173 some licensees would accordingly prefer to negotiate with individual 
members rather than take a pool license.  Unbundling thus effectively runs 
the risk of coercing licensees to take a pool license that likely contains 
unnecessary patents174—or worse, a pool license that contains substitutes
that would otherwise compete on price.175 
171. See, e.g., Unified Files IPR Against US 9,338,449 Owned by Velos Media, LLC, 
UNIFIED PATENTS (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2018/11/8/
unified-files-ipr-against-us-9338449-owned-by-velos-media-llc [https://perma.cc/94SR-
XXTA] (noting that a patent assigned to Velos was previously owned by Velos member
Qualcomm).
172. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Michael Salinger, The Policy Implications of Licensing 
Standard Essential FRAND-Committed Patents in Bundles, in COMPLICATIONS AND 
QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR 37, 52 (Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Devaiah, & 
Indranath Gupta eds., 2018). 
173. See supra Section V.C. 
174. As discussed above in Section V.C, to the extent the Federal Circuit has otherwise 
approved of bundling SEPs and non-SEPs in Philips, that decision is distinguishable 
because it was premised on the One-Monopoly-Rent-Theorem’s assumption that one of 
the products is being supplied at a monopoly price. See supra Section V.C. 
175. In addition to the risks addressed in this section, some pools use later-granted 
SEPs of trivial value to continue to extract royalties long after other, more valuable SEPs 
expire.  This practice, referred to as “evergreening,” allows SEP-holders to continue collecting 
royalties for expired foundational patents because the standard has been updated to include
patented, less important functionality.  See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,R40917, 
PATENT “EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1, 4 (2009). 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
We conclude by considering recommendations for the legal analysis 
of pools, as well as precautions patent pools and their members should 
implement to mitigate against the anticompetitive risks discussed above. 
The recommendations below are not exhaustive, but instead form the baseline 
for a fair assessment of the state of SEP pool licensing today. 
A. Legal and Economic Analysis 
First, courts and competition law enforcement authorities should abandon 
the presumption that SEP pools do not increase market power relative to 
each of the SEP owners individually.  As discussed in Section IV.A, SEP 
licenses impose competitive restraints on what other SEP-holders for the 
same standard can seek in royalties.  Acknowledging how pooling SEPs can 
lead to augmented market power would help courts and agencies better
understand other anticompetitive risks that SEP pools may engender. 
Second, the burden of proof should be shifted when a SEP pool license 
contains any provision that prima facie creates incentives not to engage in
individual licensing.  Under that framework, the pool would have to show 
that the presence of such a provision does not mean the pool is otherwise 
anticompetitive.  This approach is appropriate and necessary because
many pools are structured or operate in a way that strongly disincentivizes 
individual licensing—the importance of which the historical DOJ Business 
Review Letters rightly emphasized to limit the ability of a pool’s licensors 
to shield the pool from competitive alternatives.  Had the DOJ employed 
such an approach in the Avanci 5G Business Review Letter, it would have 
more seriously considered the potential anticompetitive effects of the 
litigation reimbursement provisions. 
B. Precautions Pools Should Implement 
SEP licensors participating in pools as well as their licensing agents 
should also consider implementing the structural and organizational changes 
described below to protect against anticompetitive harm. 
First, SEP owners should require their licensing agents to expressly
commit to abide by the FRAND encumbrances on the SEP owner’s patents,
and that such commitments are reflected in the licenses the pool offers.
An unequivocal statement along these lines would make it harder for 
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licensing agents to later retract such positions and claim no obligation to
license under FRAND terms, as discussed in Section V.A above. 
Second, SEP pools should provide a detailed explanation of how they
interpret the FRAND commitments of their members, as well as how they
ensure the valuation methodology applied to their portfolios yields an aggregate 
FRAND rate.  The resulting transparency would reduce the competitive 
harms set forth in Sections V.B and V.D above. 
Third, SEP pools should provide more information about the size of their 
portfolios, the number and identity of licensees, whether the rates charged 
vary according to licensees, and other historical licensing information.176 
Licensees and potential licensees should have full access to the historical
rate and licensing information for the members’ patents in the pool, such 
that the pool may provide complete information to potential and current 
licensees.177  Augmented transparency measures should also mitigate against
the potential double-dipping problem described in Section IV.B above 
where multiple pools cover the same patent(s). 
Fourth, because of the vast over-declaration of SEPs described in 
Section V.C above, pools should implement a more vigorous process to 
ensure that all of the patents in the pool are valid and essential.  For example, 
patent pools should conduct regular essentiality and validity audits and
provide a mechanism for rates to be reduced in the event patents are found
nonessential or invalid,178 or if the licensee already is licensed to some
portion of the pool’s portfolio separately.179  Additionally, such screening 
should be done by technical experts who truly are independent from the 
pool itself and compensated in a way that does not bias towards findings 
of essentiality.  Even the Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter acknowledged
the importance of the independence of the evaluators, highlighting how 
Avanci’s evaluators are paid “fixed fee regardless of the outcome of the
180 evaluation.”
Fifth, and finally, SEP pools should not be restricted from licensing 
at any level in a vertical supply chain.181  This requires not only making a 
176. See FSA PAPER, supra note 87, at 7. 
177. Even if pools do not provide historical rate and licensing information, pool 
administrators could require disclosures from licensors to the pool administrators and offer 
a commitment to pool licensees that the rates comply with FRAND. 
178. See id. at 5. 
179. Patent pools should also consider screening for enforceability to account for implied 
waiver. 
180. Avanci 5G DOJ Business Review Letter, supra note 48, at 14 (citing Letter from 
Mark H. Hamer, Partner, Baker & McKenzie LLP, to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1298631/
download [https://perma.cc/PQV6-D8VL].
181. See FSA PAPER, supra note 87, at 6. 
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license functionally available but also ensuring that the license offered is 
truly fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory—and in particular does not 
simply seek to capture value added by virtue of the higher price of the
end-user device practicing the technology.  This precaution would reduce 
the risk of harm described in Section V.B above. Again, the DOJ Avanci 
5G Business Review Letter failed to consider this harm. 
* * * * * 
The SEP licensing and assertion landscape has undergone dramatic
changes in the time since the historical DOJ Business Review Letters were
released, and the one business review letter issued since that time ignored 
these important developments.  While it remains the case that SEP pools, 
like any other patent pool or cross-licensing arrangement, can produce 
some procompetitive benefits, those benefits often are diminished in practice. 
This is because (a) SEP pools can increase market power because SEPs
effectively compete with other SEPs in a broader technology licensing
market; and (b) SEP pools do not reduce transaction costs to the same 
extent when multiple pools for the same standard arise. 
Moreover, whatever procompetitive benefits remain must be weighed 
against the serious risk of anticompetitive harm that now is apparent given 
the increasingly aggressive actions by some SEP owners and licensing agents 
acting on their behalf.  Collectively, SEP-holders and licensing agents can 
and do engage in behavior that hinders licensees from obtaining SEP licenses 
on FRAND terms and conditions, despite the SEP-holder’s original FRAND
promise. This includes (a) the licensing agent expressly disavowing any 
FRAND obligation; (b) restrictions in pool governance documents regarding 
(i) entities’ eligibility for a license based on their position in the supply 
chain and (ii) the incentives to forego bilateral negotiations; (c) including 
non-SEPs to collect supra-FRAND royalties; and (d) unbundling SEP 
portfolios.
Considering these real-world risks, courts and competition enforcement 
authorities should reconsider the traditional framework for evaluating
SEP pools.  In addition, SEP pools and licensing agents should implement 
changes to restore an appropriate balance between licensees and SEP-
holders, which is in keeping with the intent of the FRAND commitment
in the first place. Only when these necessary revisions are made will SEP 
pools return to the glory days of the past. 
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